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 Sentencing and the Salience of Pain 
and Hope 
Benjamin L. Berger* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Sentencing judges rarely speak about punishment. There is much 
discussion of sentencing objectives, with courts debating, for example, the 
relative situational importance of deterrence and denunciation, as compared 
with rehabilitation. Appellate courts emphasize the fundamental purpose of 
sentencing, which, in Canada, “is to contribute, along with crime prevention 
initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and 
safe society by imposing just sanctions”.1 One can find careful reflection on 
the principles of sentencing, with appellate courts giving guidance on 
principles of parity and parsimony, mitigation and aggravation. With this, a 
rich sentencing jurisprudence has developed to help judges to arrive at an 
appropriate form of sanction, imposed in a fit quantum. But all of this is 
really just the technocratic rendering of the thing itself. “Sentencing” — and 
the language of principles and objectives that fuel it — is the bureaucratized 
expression of how one arrives at what truly is at stake after a finding of 
criminal liability: the infliction and experience of suffering at the hands of 
the state. The law of sentencing, as we have it now, is overwhelmingly a 
kind of meta-narrative: a principled and careful reflection, to be sure, but a 
principled and careful reflection about how to engage in a process already 
one step removed from punishment itself.  
What would a jurisprudence of sentencing that was induced from the 
experience of punishment rather than deduced from the technocracy of 
criminal justice look like? Otherwise put, what would we expect to find  
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in sentencing jurisprudence if one began with a phenomenology of 
punishment? One answer is that we would expect to find more careful 
attention paid to the empirical bases for our hopes surrounding punishment. 
One might expect to see more interest in and significance attached to how, 
when, and why offenders are actually deterred, rehabilitated, or made more 
responsible. At a time when facts are out of political favour in matters of 
criminal justice policy, such a jurisprudential reinvestment in the empirical 
would be refreshing, treating sentencing objectives with the seriousness 
and realism that one would think they demand.  
And yet there is another answer to the question of what we would 
expect to see in a sentencing jurisprudence calibrated to the experience 
of punishment. In such a jurisprudence, another set of terms would be 
salient for the sentencing judge, producing a different and enlarged sense 
of what is relevant to just and proportional punishment. Those terms 
would be drawn from what an individual experiences as he or she lives 
through the state’s response to his or her crime. In this jurisprudence 
“from up close”, we would be interested in the pain, loss, estrangement, 
alienation and other features of the life that the criminal justice system 
imposes on the offender in response to his or her wrongdoing. Rather 
than the abstractness of quantum, the focus would be the experience of 
suffering at the hands of the state. It is, after all, the character of that 
experience that acts upon the offender and, in so doing, dictates the 
realization of our sentencing objectives; it is, moreover, the character of 
that experience that imposes the enormous moral burden that sentencing 
judges must bear. In short, in such a jurisprudence, sentencing judges 
would actually speak about punishment.  
In this article I suggest that certain decisions of the Supreme Court of 
Canada nudge the law of sentencing in this direction, offering provocative 
openings for thinking about sentencing and punishment in richer and 
more sensitive ways. These openings arise around two elemental 
components of the phenomenology of punishment — pain and hope — 
and the ways in which both are salient to sentencing. I will argue that in 
the two cases at the heart of this article, R. v. Nasogaluak2 and R. v. 
Zinck,3 attentiveness to the experience of pain and hope impels a 
broadening of judicial sightlines about punishment and suggests a turn in 
how judges should reason about just and appropriate sentences. This turn 
might offer escape from the narrowness and abstractness involved in the 
                                                                                                                                   
2 [2010] S.C.J. No. 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nasogaluak”]. 
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prevailing idea that the quality of punishment can be juridicially 
measured by reference to form and quantum of sentence alone. This 
current in the case law offers a new framing of the essential remit of the 
judge in the task of sentencing: to account for the offender’s aggregate 
experience of the state’s response to his wrongdoing.4 
Justice Louis LeBel authored both Nasogaluak and Zinck. Over his 
years on the Supreme Court of Canada, Justice LeBel’s criminal justice 
jurisprudence has been marked by attentiveness to the lived realities and 
structures of power with which the criminal law is engaged. His 
decisions on police powers have reflected an abiding concern with the 
way that state power ramifies in the lives of individuals.5 His substantive 
criminal law jurisprudence has paid careful attention to how the criminal 
law must carefully attend to the circumstances in which individuals find 
themselves.6 In all of this work, Justice LeBel has evidenced sensitivity 
to the force and effects of the criminal law and modesty in the face of the 
resulting burdens of judgment. There is perhaps no moment in the work 
of a judge that is more harrowing and morally demanding than the act of 
sentencing — the moment at which he or she decrees the suffering of 
                                                                                                                                   
4 This claim, and the language of “experience of punishment”, used throughout this  
article, brings this article into contact with the subjectivist-retributivist debate in punishment  
theory, discussing whether punishment should be indexed to the subjective experience of offender, 
including his or her particular abilities, sensitivities, baseline conditions, and the burdens he or she 
experiences from non-state sources. As will emerge apparent, although I share the subjectivists’ 
approach to punishment as “suffering” and concern with the “experience of punishment”, my focus 
in this piece is narrower than theirs, specifically concerned as it is with punishment as the suffering 
caused by the actions of the state through the criminal process. As an account of a turn in the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence on sentencing, this article is not focused on the 
philosophical debate, though I will touch further on these issues, and the place of my argument 
within them, in Part V of this article. For key pieces in this debate see Adam J. Kolber, “The 
Subjective Experience of Punishment” (2009) 109 Colum. L. Rev. 182; Shawn J. Bayern, “The 
Significance of Private Burdens and Lost Benefits for a Fair-Play Analysis of Punishment” (2009) 
12 New Crim. L. Rev 1; John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafuso & Jonathan Masur, “Happiness and 
Punishment” (2009) 76 U. Chicago L. Rev. 1037; Dan Markel & Chad Flanders, “Bentham on Stilts: 
The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive Justice” (2010) 98 Cal. L. Rev. 907; David Gray, 
“Punishment as Suffering” (2010) 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1619; John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafuso & 
Jonathan Masur, “Retribution and the Experience of Punishment” (2010) 98 Cal. L. Rev. 1463;  
Dan Markel, Chad Flanders & David Gray, “Beyond Experience: Getting Retributive Justice Right” 
(2011) 99 Cal. L. Rev. 605. 
5 See, e.g., R. v. Sinclair, [2010] S.C.J. No. 35, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 310 (S.C.C.), in which 
Justice LeBel, writing with Fish J. in dissent, grounded a more expansive reading of the right to 
counsel in the subjective perceptions and vulnerabilities of many accused who are brought into 
contact with the criminal justice system.  
6 See, e.g., R. v. Ruzic, [2001] S.C.J. No. 25, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687 (S.C.C.), in which Justice 
LeBel installed the concept of “moral involuntariness” as a principle of fundamental justice to which 
all defences must be indexed.  
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another person. Here, too, Justice LeBel has charted out a course that 
reflects his concern with the tangible effects of criminal law on the lives 
of individuals and communities. R. v. Ipeelee,7 his powerful call to place 
practices of sentencing in direct contact with Indigenous peoples’ 
experience of the state and criminal justice, stands out in this respect.  
In this article, I show that his other sentencing jurisprudence similarly 
focuses us on the political character of punishment. Nasogaluak and Zinck 
join Ipeelee in offering an approach to sentencing that pushes judges into 
a clear-eyed encounter with the human character of that experience, with 
the modesty and sense of responsibility that this invites. In so doing, 
Justice LeBel’s sentencing jurisprudence is a fitting reflection of his 
contributions to criminal justice in Canada.  
II. PAIN 
On May 12, 2014, the early morning calm in Leduc, Alberta was 
disturbed by a high-speed police pursuit. The RCMP, following up on a 
tip about an impaired driver, were now trying to apprehend Mr. Lyle 
Nasogaluak, a man of Inuit and Dene descent; for his part, Nasogaluak 
was doing his level best to evade capture. At the conclusion of the  
chase, Mr. Nasogaluak “dangerously revers[ed] his car”8 towards the  
pursuing RCMP vehicle, before coming to an abrupt stop. By this point, 
three officers — Constables Dlin, Olthof and Chornomydz — were on  
the scene.  
When Mr. Nasogaluak opened his car door and began exiting the 
vehicle, Cst. Dlin pointed his revolver and flashlight at him and ordered 
him to get out of the car with his hands in the air. Instead, Nasogaluak 
brought his feet back into the vehicle. Constable Chornomydz intervened. 
He grabbed Mr. Nasogaluak, who was now holding on to the doorframe 
and steering wheel, and punched him in the head. Constable Chornomydz 
testified that he did so to prevent Nasogaluak from driving away and 
hitting one of the other officers with his vehicle. Mr. Nasogaluak reached 
towards Cst. Chornomydz, who again punched Mr. Nasogaluak in the 
head and then dragged him out of the car and onto the ground. Constable 
Chornomydz, on the evidence a “powerful man who would pack a mean 
punch”,9 yelled at Mr. Nasogaluak to stop resisting, punching him a  
                                                                                                                                   
7 [2012] S.C.J. No. 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ipeelee”]. 
8 Nasogaluak, supra, note 2, at para. 10.  
9 Id., at para. 37. 
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third time in the head while Cst. Chornomydz sat astride his back  
and Cst. Olthof knelt on his thigh. Constable Dlin, seeing that  
Mr. Nasogaluak did not offer his hands to be handcuffed, joined the action at 
this point, landing two punches into Mr. Nasogaluak’s back while he was 
pinned face down on the pavement, breaking two of Nasogaluak’s ribs.  
Back at the police station, Mr. Nasogaluak blew over the blood 
alcohol limit. Although he showed no obvious signs of injury and did not 
request medical attention — indeed, at one point he indicated to the 
police that he was not injured — he twice told Cst. Olthof that he was 
hurt and Cst. Dlin testified that he saw Mr. Nasogaluak crying and saying 
“I can’t breathe”. The supervisor on duty also testified that he observed 
Mr. Nasogaluak “leaning over and moaning as if in pain”.10 Upon his 
release the next morning, Mr. Nasogaluak went to the hospital where the 
doctors found that he had broken ribs that had led to a collapsed lung, 
requiring emergency surgery.  
No records were made of the use of force during arrest, of the 
injuries suffered by Mr. Nasogaluak, nor of the fact that Cst. Dlin drew 
his weapon. There were no videos or recordings and “the trial judge 
seem[ed] to have had serious suspicious [sic] and concerns about the 
absence of videotapes and may have drawn from it some negative 
inferences about the nature of the police conduct in this case”.11 
Mr. Nasogaluak pled guilty to charges of impaired driving and 
fleeing the police. At the sentencing hearing, he argued that the 
misconduct of the police constituted a breach of his Charter12 rights that 
justified a stay of proceedings or, in the alternative, a reduced sentence. 
The sentencing judge, Sirrs J., agreed that the officers’ use of force 
breached Mr. Nasogaluak’s section 7 right to security of the person (the 
judge also “somewhat surprisingly”13 found that his section 11(d) right to the 
presumption of innocence had been offended). Justice Sirrs concluded 
that although the first and second punches were lawful, the subsequent 
blows were unwarranted and excessive. Given these Charter breaches, 
Sirrs J. concluded that section 24(1) of the Charter authorized him to 
reduce Mr. Nasogaluak’s sentence as a constitutional remedy. Whereas 
the normal range for conviction on these charges would be between  
                                                                                                                                   
10 Id., at para. 12. 
11 Id. 
12 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
13 Nasogaluak, supra, note 2, at para. 15. 
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six and 18 months incarceration, Sirrs J. imposed a 12-month conditional 
discharge on each count, to be served concurrently, and a one year 
driving prohibition. Justice Sirrs reasoned that this “life-altering 
experience”14 satisfied the goals of deterrence and denunciation and, given 
the egregious police misconduct, incarceration was not appropriate.  
Although it disputed some of the findings of fact made by the 
sentencing judge, a majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta affirmed 
Sirrs J.’s conclusion on the section 7 breach and his use of section 24(1) 
to reduce the sentence. However, given the minimum fine of $600 for a 
first offence of impaired driving, the Court of Appeal set aside the 
conditional discharge on that count, substituted a conviction, and ordered 
that Mr. Nasogaluak pay the minimum fine. A majority of the Court 
affirmed the conditional discharge for evading a police officer.15 The 
Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.  
The appeal put two central questions before the Supreme Court:  
(1) whether the sentencing judge properly concluded that the police had 
used excessive force amounting to a section 7 violation; and (2) whether a 
reduction in sentence was an appropriate remedy pursuant to section 24(1). 
The Court had little difficulty affirming the Court of Appeal’s conclusion 
that the trial judge had acted reasonably in finding that the constables’ use 
of force in this case was excessive. Justice LeBel, writing for a unanimous 
Court, emphasized the force of these blows and the serious health 
consequences for Mr. Nasogaluak. The Court also found that the breach of 
section 7 “is easily made out on the facts of this case”.16  
The focus of Justice LeBel’s reasons is the question of how this kind 
of police action and its effects on the offender should be factored into 
sentencing decisions. On this point, Justice LeBel’s key message — the 
conclusion of greatest interest to this article — is that the reduction in 
sentence was appropriate but that such reductions did not require the 
extraordinary resort to a constitutional remedy pursuant to section 24(1) 
of the Charter. In circumstances such as this one, in which the police 
have acted egregiously with serious effects for the offender, conventional 
                                                                                                                                   
14 Id., at para. 17. 
15 Justice Jean Côté, in dissent, would not have reduced the sentence outside of the judge-
made sentencing guidelines, which he treated as “akin to a minimum penalty” (id., at para. 25).  
In the words of the Supreme Court of Canada, Côté J.A. “had difficulty accepting that the Charter 
breaches were so egregious that they warranted the remedy of a conditional discharge” (id.). The 
Supreme Court of Canada’s unanimous decision in this case roundly rejected both of these 
conclusions. 
16 Id., at para. 38. 
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sentencing principles could not only accommodate but might actually 
impel a reduction in sentence. Justice LeBel explains that in 
extraordinary cases Charter breaches suffered by an offender might 
authorize the reduction of a sentence below a statutory minimum, a 
remedy that would require the authority of section 24(1). However, the 
only statutory minimum at play in Nasogaluak was the $600 fine and 
therefore, in the absence of a mandatory minimum standing in the way  
of a just and appropriate sentence, the “life-altering experience” that  
Mr. Nasogaluak suffered at the hands of the RCMP could be addressed 
using the ordinary objectives and principles of sentencing.  
Justice LeBel anchors his conclusions in the centrality of the 
principle of proportionality to the sentencing process. He notes that, 
although it is now specifically articulated as the fundamental principle of 
sentencing in section 718.1 of the Criminal Code, the importance of 
proportionality as the guiding principle for just and appropriate 
sentencing has both a long history and a constitutional dimension 
reflected in section 12 of the Charter. The principle of proportionality, he 
explains, has two functions. First, it has a “limiting or restraining 
function”,17 whereby solicitousness about the principle ensures that the 
offender is punished no more than is necessary. Second, it has a balancing 
dimension that is concerned with “judicial and social censure”.18 
Attentiveness to proportionality means that judges will craft sentences that 
adequately reflect and condemn offenders’ “role in the offence and the 
harm they caused”.19  
And yet despite the pride of place given to proportionality in the 
judgment, for the purposes of this article, the conceptually pivotal move 
made by Justice LeBel is to draw these general principles of proportionality 
down into the life and circumstances of the individual offender. He 
underscores that sentencing is, at its heart, an individualized process. 
The question is always what is fit and appropriate — what is a proportionate 
sentence — given the particular circumstances of the offence and the 
offender. Those individualized circumstances are what guide a judge in 
selecting sentencing objectives. Those circumstances are the target of the 
mitigating and aggravating considerations listed in the Criminal Code and 
used by sentencing judges. The fitness of the sentence — the ultimate 
                                                                                                                                   
17 Id., at para. 42. 
18 Id. Justice LeBel again describes these two functions of the proportionality principle in 
Ipeelee, supra, note 7, at para. 37. 
19 Nasogaluak, supra, note 2, at para. 42. 
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standard for all punishments — is a function of responsiveness to these 
circumstances. Circumstantial fitness, according to Justice LeBel, is the 
orienting idea of Canadian sentencing. 
This priority for the circumstantial fitness of a sentence is why general 
sentencing ranges developed by appellate courts are merely guidelines and 
must be departed from where the circumstances so require. Although 
ranges help to produce parity in sentencing, “[a] judge can order a sentence 
outside that range”, Justice LeBel clearly explains, “as long as it is in 
accordance with the principles and objectives of sentencing. Thus, a 
sentence falling outside the regular range of appropriate sentences is not 
necessarily unfit.”20 This priority on calibrating sentence to the 
circumstances of the offence and the offender also explains why minimum 
sentences are so deeply problematic: they place a predictive limit on what 
might constitute circumstantial “fitness”, heedless of the unpredictable 
range of circumstances that life might produce. Despite the restraint in his 
language, Justice LeBel’s reflection on minimum sentences in Nasogaluak 
nevertheless coveys just this concern: “[a] relatively new phenomenon in 
Canadian law, the minimum sentence is a forceful expression of 
governmental policy in the area of criminal law.”21 
Yet how does the priority that Justice LeBel gives to circumstantial 
fitness as the means to achieving proportionality allow him to give space 
for police misconduct within the normal practices of sentencing? The 
conventional wisdom is that the “circumstances” relevant to calibrating a 
sentence are the details of the offence and the harms caused, as well as 
the degree of responsibility of the offender. Section 718 states as much 
and this is precisely why the sentencing judge and the Court of Appeal in 
Nasogaluak saw the need to recruit section 24(1) in order to factor the 
Charter breaches into the sentence. Yet police misconduct in the course 
of making an arrest does not bear on the gravity of the offence for which 
Mr. Nasogaluak was convicted. Nor does it alter his degree of 
responsibility for the impaired driving or flight from the police, both of 
which occurred before the police misconduct. Nevertheless, Justice 
LeBel is saying that, without recourse to a Charter remedy, the normal 
logic of sentencing should take account of what happened to  
Mr. Nasogaluak. This is where Justice LeBel’s decision in Nasogaluak 
represents such a provocative and important imaginative expansion of 
what is salient in sentencing.  
                                                                                                                                   
20 Id., at para. 44. 
21 Id., at para. 45.  
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In justifying his conclusion, Justice LeBel explains that “[a] 
sentence cannot be ‘fit’ if it does not represent the fundamental values 
enshrined in the Charter.”22 Sentencing is about communicating 
“society’s legitimate shared values and concerns”.23 A Charter breach 
indicates that the state has offended these values and concerns and a 
sentence can and should communicate society’s resulting condemnation 
if the breach has a sufficient link to the circumstances of the offence or 
the offender. Justice LeBel defends this view by reference to section 718 
of the Criminal Code and its statement that the fundamental purpose of 
sentencing is to contribute to “respect for the law and the maintenance 
of a just, peaceful and safe society”. “This function”, he explains, “must be 
understood as providing scope for sentencing judges to consider not only 
the actions of the offender, but also those of state actors.”24 This is both a 
more expansive and a more political conception of sentencing than is 
normally conceded in the jurisprudence. Justice LeBel summarizes this 
point as follows:  
...Provided that the impugned conduct relates to the individual offender 
and the circumstances of his or her offence, the sentencing process 
includes consideration of society’s collective interest in ensuring that 
law enforcement agents respect the rule of law and the shared values of 
our society.25 
Based on these arguments about using sentencing to communicate 
society’s disapproval about Charter-offensive state conduct, one might 
conclude that what is happening in this “expansion of relevance” is the 
accommodation of a concern about society’s “standing to blame”. 
Antony Duff has written most extensively on this idea as it relates to 
criminal responsibility.26 If one understands blame as a relational or 
reciprocal process between society and an individual, it may be that 
systemic injustice or state misconduct can erode the authority that society 
has to blame an offender. By visiting serious disadvantage or inflicting 
social wrongs upon an individual, the state may share responsibility for  
 
                                                                                                                                   
22 Id., at para. 48. 
23 Id., at para. 49. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 R.A. Duff, “Blame, Moral Standing and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Trial” (2010) 23 
Ratio 123; R.A. Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009). 
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the crime, making it unjust to blame the individual.27 In a sentencing 
context, in which a decision has already been made to blame the offender, 
it may be that the reduction in society’s authority flowing from the 
misconduct of state actors reduces our sense of how much punishment the 
state, through the imposition of a sentence, can justly impose. Justice 
LeBel’s references to communicating disapproval about state misconduct 
and concern about the harm to societal values supports this interpretation 
of why the kind of Charter breach in Nasogaluak might be relevant in the 
normal sentencing calculus. Justice LeBel’s supportive reliance on R. v. 
Kirtzner,28 a case in which the Court of Appeal for Ontario reduced a 
sentence in light of the police role in creating the opportunity to commit 
the offences (albeit short of entrapment), also suggests that this derogation 
in “standing to punish” is part of what is going on in Nasogaluak. That is 
itself a significant jurisprudential development.  
And yet this does not seem to provide an entirely adequate account 
of why the experience suffered by Mr. Nasogaluak is relevant to the 
normal sentencing process. The qualifier that begins Justice LeBel’s 
summary statement reproduced above is significant: “Provided that the 
impugned conduct relates to the circumstances of the individual offender 
and the circumstances of his or her offence,”29 sentences should take 
account of this kind of misconduct. Justice LeBel repeatedly notes that 
such incidents must be connected to or “align with”30 the circumstances 
of the offender or of the offence. Appalling though it was, it is difficult to 
identify a clear link between the conduct of the RCMP officers and the 
charged offence in Nasogaluak. This is not, in fact, a case like Kirtzner 
in which the misconduct and the offence are tightly linked. All of the 
impugned conduct in this case followed the completion of the actus reus 
of the two convicted offences. Accordingly, in Nasogaluak, the nexus on 
which Justice LeBel insists would have to be found in the link between 
the police misconduct and Mr. Nasogaluak’s circumstances. Where do 
we find this link?  
                                                                                                                                   
27 For an argument in this vein surrounding poverty, see Victor Tadros, “Poverty and 
Criminal Responsibility” (2009) 43 J. Value Inquiry 391. I discuss this concept in the context of the 
law of mental disorder in Benjamin L. Berger, “Mental Disorder and the Instability of Blame in the 
Criminal Law” in Francois Tanguay-Renaud & James Stribopoulos, eds., Rethinking Criminal Law 
Theory: New Canadian Perspectives in the Philosophy of Domestic, Transnational, and 
International Criminal Law (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2012), at 117.  
28 [1976] O.J. No. 2364, 14 O.R. (2d) 665 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Kirtzner”]. 
29 Nasogaluak, supra, note 2, at para. 49 (emphasis added). 
30 Id., at para. 48.  
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The provocative answer offered by this case is that we find this nexus, 
simply, in the pain that he suffered. His sentence is justifiably reduced 
because he has already suffered harm at the hands of the state in response to 
his misconduct. When a judge decides how much and what form of 
punishment to inflict on the accused, the ways in which he has already 
suffered is salient. The sentencing judge in Nasogaluak was right to imagine 
that the accused’s lived experience — in this case his “life-altering 
experience” — of the entirety of the state’s actions taken in response to his 
criminal acts is the engine that drives the sentencing machine. In this way,  
I read Nasogaluak as authority for the idea that punishment is found in the 
aggregate experience of the state’s response to an offender’s wrongdoing. For 
Mr. Nasogaluak, the character of that experience was one of pain. That pain, 
suffered outside the colouring lines of duration and form of incarceration, is 
relevant to reasoning about a just and appropriate sentence. As a 
jurisprudential contribution, Nasogaluak directs sentencing judges to think 
about the punishment — and, therefore, the salient factors affecting a “fit” 
sentence — in a more expansive way than we are accustomed to seeing. 
Other statements made by Justice LeBel in Nasogaluak support this 
interpretation. He describes the concept at the heart of the case as being 
about “recognizing harm or prejudice caused to the offender as a 
mitigating circumstance”.31 He underscores that incidents that fall short of 
a Charter breach — short of violating the fundamental values enshrined in 
the Charter — can nevertheless affect the fitness of a sentence. And he 
points to cases not only of police violence, but prosecutorial and police 
delay, as well as unlawful searches of private premises. A sentence must 
be indexed to the roots-to-branch experience of the state’s response to an 
offender’s crime.  
Nor does Nasogaluak sit alone as a recent Supreme Court of Canada 
case that points to this more expansive sense of what “counts” as 
punishment in the context of sentencing, suggesting a turn in our 
sentencing law to take greater account of this aggregate experience of 
punishment. In 2013, Wagner J. decided R. v. Pham32 on behalf of a 
unanimous Court. At issue was whether an otherwise fit sentence can and 
should be reduced in light of collateral consequences of sentencing that 
would arise by operation of the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act33 (“IRPA”). The accused was sentenced to two years imprisonment 
                                                                                                                                   
31 Id., at para. 54.  
32 [2013] S.C.J. No. 100, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 739 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Pham”]. 
33 S.C. 2001, c. 27. 
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for certain drug offences. By operation of the IRPA, that sentence would 
mean that Mr. Pham would lose his right to appeal a removal order 
against him. He therefore applied to have his sentence reduced by one 
day. The Crown, previously unaware of this consequence, consented; 
however, the Court of Appeal of Alberta refused to vary the sentence 
explaining that to do so would frustrate the objectives of the IRPA. Like 
Justice LeBel in Nasogaluak, Wagner J. reasoned from the fundamental 
principle of proportionality and, in particular, the principles of 
individualization and parity, to conclude that collateral consequences of a 
sentence are relevant in arriving at a just and fit sentence. In this case, the 
Court found that the effects of the IRPA should be considered and it 
reduced Mr. Pham’s sentence by one day. But consider the breadth of 
Wagner J.’s general statement of principle: 
[T]he collateral consequences of a sentence are any consequences for 
the impact of the sentence on the particular offender. They may be 
taken into account in sentencing as personal circumstances of the 
offender. However, they are not, strictly speaking, aggravating or 
mitigating factors, since such factors are by definition related only to 
the gravity of the offence or to the degree of responsibility of the 
offender…. Their relevance flows from the application of the principles 
of individualization and parity.34 
Justice Wagner made clear that sentences should not be artificially 
manipulated to create unfit sentences that frustrate the effects of 
legislation. However, the overall consequences — “any consequences for 
the impact of the sentence on the particular offender” — are ingredients 
in arriving at a fit sentence in the normal sentencing process.35 As in 
Nasogaluak, the focus is on the suffering inflicted on the offender 
through the State’s response to his wrongdoing. 
And so Nasogaluak may have signalled a turn to a more expansive 
way of thinking about sentencing. One can read Nasogaluak through the 
lens of Charter breaches and their relevance to sentencing; I am 
suggesting that it is both more illuminating and more provocative to read 
it as a case about pain and the importance of grounding the act of 
                                                                                                                                   
34 Pham, supra, note 32, at para. 11. 
35 There are elements in existing sentencing practice that go some way to considering a 
broader range of the consequences of imprisonment. Consider, for example, the case law indicating 
that sentencing judges should account for the separation of a mother from her family when arriving 
at a fit sentence (see, e.g., R. v. Collins, [2011] O.J. No. 978, 104 O.R. (3d) 241 (Ont. C.A.)) or, 
more generally, the impact of incarceration on families (see, e.g., R. v. Geraldes, [1965] J.Q. no 22, 
46 C.R. 365 (Que. C.A.)). 
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sentencing in an offender’s experience of state punishment. To develop 
that theme, I turn now to a case that exposes another dimension of that 
experience. 
III. HOPE 
R. v. Zinck was a relatively low-profile decision that attracted little 
media attention and has gathered no significant academic interest.  
A unanimous and succinct decision penned by Justice LeBel, the case 
concerns the interpretation of and proper analytic approach to section 743.6 
of the Criminal Code, the provision that allows sentencing judges to 
delay parole eligibility for a wide range of offences. The decision is clear 
and legally uncomplicated; the analytic path that the case lays down for 
deciding on an extended period of parole ineligibility is arguably 
somewhat awkward, but that is largely a function of the legislation itself. 
And yet if we turn it in our hands just a little, this otherwise unassuming 
case offers some provocative reflections on changes in the role of 
sentencing judges and the dimensions of punishment to which judges 
must attend. Like Nasogaluak, the case gestures to the rising importance 
of a judge’s attention to the experience of punishment, rather than simply 
the quantum of sentence, as the measure of a just and appropriate 
sentence. In his reasons, Justice LeBel points to a significant shift in the 
role of sentencing courts, a shift occasioned by legislative change but one 
that, I suggest, calls on judges to adopt a richer understanding of 
punishment and suffering. As is so frequently true, the case arose out of 
sad facts.  
Thomas Zinck was in his mid-50s and had a long criminal record, 
including convictions for robbery, theft, other property crimes and 
alcohol and firearms offences, as well as parole and probation violations. 
A heavy drinker, “[h]e was also fond of firearms and kept a number of 
them in his house.”36 Zinck lived next door to Stéphane Caissie and, 
according to the evidence, they had an amicable relationship.  
Caissie’s house had recently been the subject of three break-ins, and “[i]t 
appears that Zinck took it on himself to watch for burglars.”37  
On the night that led to his conviction for manslaughter, a night on which 
he had been drinking heavily, Zinck thought that he saw burglars at his 
                                                                                                                                   
36 Zinck, supra, note 3, at para. 3. 
37 Id. 
350 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2015) 70 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
neighbour’s house. He went over to Caissie’s home with a loaded gun 
and banged on the door, stirring Caissie out of bed. When Caissie 
answered the door Zinck’s gun went off, killing Caissie instantly. The 
sentencing judge was not able to conclude what precisely happened; 
what was clear, however, was that Zinck was heavily intoxicated and 
stated, “shortly after the shooting, that he had ‘got one’ (a burglar).”38 
Mr. Zinck pleaded guilty to manslaughter. In view of the criminal 
record of the accused and the circumstances of the offence, the Crown 
asked for a 15-year term of incarceration and further requested that the 
sentencing judge consider delaying Mr. Zinck’s parole ineligibility 
period pursuant to section 743.6 of the Criminal Code. Defence counsel 
made no specific submission on the applicability of this provision. The 
section provides that, rather than allowing the standard operation of the 
Corrections and Conditional Release Act,39 when an offender receives a 
sentence of incarceration for two years or more, a court may order that 
the period of parole ineligibility be raised to one half of the total sentence 
(rather than the usual one third) or 10 years, whichever is less. The 
section specifies that the court may do so “if satisfied, having regard to 
the circumstances of the commission of the offence and the character and 
circumstances of the offender, that the expression of society’s 
denunciation of the offence or the objective of specific or general 
deterrence so requires”. Subsection (2) states “[f]or greater certainty” 
that “the paramount principles which are to guide the court under this 
section are denunciation and specific or general deterrence, with 
rehabilitation of the offender, in all cases, being subordinate to these 
paramount principles.” 
The sentencing judge described the crime as one of “totally 
gratuitous violence, committed in the home of the victim” and noted the 
“poor prospects for rehabilitation”.40 He concluded that the protection of 
the public was the chief consideration and imposed a sentence of 12 years 
of incarceration. He went on to conclude that this was, indeed, a proper 
case for the application of section 743.6, explaining laconically that, in 
light of the circumstances and character of the offender and the need for 
denunciation, the parole ineligibility period would be six years.  
                                                                                                                                   
38 Id., at para. 4. 
39 S.C. 1992, c. 20. 
40 Zinck, supra, note 3, at para. 7. 
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On appeal, Mr. Zinck argued that there had been certain failures of 
procedural fairness (no written notice of the section 743.6 application and 
insufficient reasons) and that the sentencing judge had erred by applying 
section 743.6 without “special or exceptional” circumstances. The Court of 
Appeal of New Brunswick split on this issue, with the majority saying that 
no such special circumstances were required and the dissent insisting on a 
more demanding standard for the delay of parole ineligibility. At the 
Supreme Court of Canada, Justice LeBel dispensed with the procedural 
objections with relative ease.41 The central jurisprudential point would be 
whether special or exceptional circumstances were needed for a judge to 
delay parole ineligibility and, relatedly, how a judge ought to go about 
analyzing this question.  
Ultimately, Justice LeBel found that the delayed ineligibility period 
was justified in Mr. Zinck’s case. To arrive at this conclusion, however, 
he had to resolve the interpretive disagreement that both split the Court 
of Appeal in this case and could be found in the appellate jurisprudence 
in various provinces. Justice LeBel describes one “thread” in the 
jurisprudence that views this step — delaying parole ineligibility — as 
exceptional and therefore requiring the clear identification of some 
special or exceptional circumstances to justify the use of section 743.6. 
He notes that many judgments have adopted this kind of approach, with 
the Courts of Appeal for Ontario and Quebec interpreting the provision 
in this “narrow” way. On the other hand, according to certain courts, “a 
sentencing judge does not have to look for unusual circumstances before 
ordering delayed parole.”42 Here he points to the Court of Appeal of 
Alberta decision in R. v. Hanley,43 in which a panel comprised of Fraser 
C.J.A. and Rawlins and Binder JJ. rejected the view that section 743.6 
could only be used if the facts of the case were “extraordinary”, 
“unusual”, or even “particularly aggravating”.44 The Court of Appeal of 
Alberta stated, that “[t]here is nothing in s. 743.6 which indicates that it 
is a condition precedent to its exercise that either the circumstances of 
the offence or the offender be in this ‘unusual’ category, let alone so 
unusual, in order for a trial judge to impose an order under this 
                                                                                                                                   
41 Written notice, he concluded, is not required, and although the sentencing judge could 
well have — and probably ought to have — offered more extensive reasons, those given did not 
breach the minimum standard for adequacy of reasons. Id., at paras. 35, 38-39. 
42 Id., at para. 28. 
43 R. v. Hanley, [1998] A.J. No. 1490, 228 A.R. 291 (Alta. C.A.).  
44 Id., at para. 18, cited in Zinck, supra, note 3, at para. 28. 
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section.”45 As is apparent, this “broad” interpretation of section 743.6 
would make delayed parole ineligibility a more “normal” part of the 
sentencing process.  
In a charitable reading of this jurisprudential landscape, Justice 
LeBel concludes that this conflict of interpretations is more apparent than 
real. He states that the extent of the inconsistency “has been overplayed” 
and that if one looks at the actual use of the provision, appellate courts 
seem to be on the same page.46 I say that this reading is generous because 
the two strands of interpretation assume very different postures towards 
the act of delaying parole ineligibility. There is a clear gap between the 
ethic or attitude that each, respectively, invites a sentencing judge to 
adopt. And, on this point of the proper posture that a judge should 
assume, Justice LeBel seems to side with the “narrow” or restrained use 
of section 743.6. He explains that a sentencing judge should adopt a 
“two-step intellectual process when deciding whether to delay parole”.47 
The first step is to apply the normal sentencing principles in arriving at 
an appropriate sentence for the crime. Then the judge turns to the issue of 
delayed parole and reconsiders all of the circumstances in light of the 
sentencing principles and objectives, but with priority given to the 
specified factors of denunciation, and specific and general deterrence. 
And what is the test for deciding whether a delay in parole eligibility is 
warranted? It is in answer to this question that one detects the tenor of 
restraint in Justice LeBel’s decision. 
He explains that, at this second step, the burden is on the prosecution 
to demonstrate that an order of delayed parole eligibility “is needed to 
reflect the objectives of sentencing, with awareness of the special weight 
ascribed by Parliament to the social imperatives of denunciation and 
deterrence”.48 The test is one of necessity. Having already balanced all of 
the objectives and arrived at a “fit sentence” (one begins here to feel the 
awkwardness of this two-stage balancing), the prosecution must 
convince the judge that “additional punishment is required”.49 In tension 
with the Alberta Court of Appeal’s statements that nothing about section 
743.6 requires “unusual” or “particularly aggravating” circumstances, 
Justice LeBel emphasizes that section 743.6 must not be used “in a 
                                                                                                                                   
45 Id., cited in Zinck, id.  
46 Zinck, id., at para. 29. 
47 Id. 
48 Id., at para. 31. 
49 Id. 
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routine manner”,50 and “should not be ordered without necessity”.51 “The 
decision to delay parole remains”, Justice LeBel explains, “out of the 
ordinary” and, though available as an option, should only be employed 
where it “appears to be required” in order to arrive at an appropriate 
punishment in the circumstances of the case.52 In a crucial statement, 
Justice LeBel describes the orienting idea that should inform the judge at 
the end of this two-stage intellectual process: “the sentencing decision 
must remain alive to the nature and position of delayed parole in criminal 
law as a special, additional form of punishment.”53 
This statement is crucial not only because it reveals the posture of 
restraint that should inform the judge, but also because it offers the key 
to unlocking a deeper significance of the Zinck decision. In what does the 
specialness of delayed parole inhere? In brief, it is the way that it 
involves the sentencing judge in the manipulation of hope.54 In this way, 
it is another dimension of the shift in the role of the sentencing judge 
suggested in Nasogaluak and Pham, one that is more sensitive and 
responsive to the experience of punishment. 
However rare the use of section 743.6 may be, placing the issue of 
parole eligibility within the remit of the sentencing judge — integrating 
it into the global assessment of a fit sentence — marks a significant 
imaginative reconfiguration of the sentencing judge’s relationship to 
punishment. In an important section of the Zinck decision, Justice LeBel 
explains that there had traditionally been a hard separation between those 
who determined the proper sentence and those responsible for running 
jails and overseeing the conditions and implementation of punishment. 
Courts discharged the first responsibility at the moment of sentencing 
and other agencies — parole boards, correctional offices, etc. — tended 
to the details of punishment. In this division of labour, issues of parole 
                                                                                                                                   
50 Id., at para. 30.  
51 Id., at para. 31. 
52 Id., at para. 33. 
53 Id., at para. 31 (emphasis added). 
54 Very little legal scholarship has considered the relationship between law and hope. 
Although their focus is not punishment and sentencing, Kathryn Abrams and Hila Keren discuss 
law’s role in encouraging hope in “Law in the Cultivation of Hope” (2007) 95 Cal. L. Rev. 319. 
They adopt “a vision of hope based on the assertion of human agency as opposed to one which 
places its faith in the supernatural or extrahuman” (at 325). See also Alice Ristroph, “Hope, 
Imprisonment, and the Constitution” (2010) 23 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 75 [hereinafter “Ristroph”]; 
Philip Pettit, “Hope and Its Place in Mind” (2004) 592 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 152.  
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eligibility were simply not part of the work of the judge.55 Parole 
assessments focus on “the ongoing observation and assessment of the 
personality and behaviour of the offender during his or her 
incarceration,”56 a set of assessments that looks to the dangerousness and 
the offender’s individualized prospects of reintegrating into the 
community. Parole determinations are, in essence, responsive to the lives 
lived by offenders while serving their sentences. Parole is itself a 
manipulation of the character of that experience; it is about the 
“conditions under which the sentence is being served”.57 In provocative 
contradistinction to the conventional way of viewing the sentencing task, 
these decisions are, as Justice LeBel puts it, “highly attentive to context 
and based, at least in part, on what actually happened during the 
incarceration of the offender”.58  
Making delayed parole eligibility a sentencing variable in a wide 
range of offences restructures this allocation of concern. In this way, 
“[t]he adoption of s. 743.6 altered ... significantly the nature and scope of 
sentencing decisions in Canadian criminal law.”59 Justice LeBel notes 
that, with its new role in the judge’s sentencing assessment, “[d]eferred 
access to parole has now become a part of the punishment”.60 This 
change necessarily draws the sentencing judge away from more abstract 
considerations of quantum and form in sentencing to the character of the 
time served. Delaying parole is a means of adding “harshness” to the 
sentence, as Justice LeBel recognizes.61 That harshness is created 
through the manipulation of the affective life of the offender. It is to be a 
sentence served for a longer period bereft of hope of relief or release.  
                                                                                                                                   
55 The one notable exception was sentencing for second degree murder, which carries a 
minimum punishment of life imprisonment and a variable parole ineligibility period of between  
10 and 25 years.  
56 Zinck, supra, note 3, at para. 19. 
57 Id., at para. 20. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 47, 2 S.C.R. 143,  
at 150-51 (S.C.C.); R. v. C.A.M., [1996] S.C.J. No. 28, 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 62 (S.C.C.). 
58 Zinck, supra, note 3, at para. 19 (emphasis added). As La Forest J. wrote for the majority 
of the Court in R. v. Lyons, [1987] S.C.J. No. 62, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, at 341 (S.C.C.), a case 
concerning the constitutionality of indeterminate sentences imposed through the dangerous offenders 
scheme, “it is clear that an enlightened inquiry under s. 12 must concern itself, first and foremost, 
with the way in which the effects of punishment are likely to be experienced. Seen in this light, 
therefore, the parole process assumes the utmost significance for it is that process alone that is 
capable of truly accommodating and tailoring the sentence to fit the circumstances of the individual 
offender” (emphasis added). 
59 Zinck, supra, note 3, at para. 22. 
60 Id., at para. 23. 
61 Id., at para. 24.  
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In this, delaying parole becomes a “significant component of a sentence”.62 
“It may almost entirely extinguish any hope of early freedom from the 
confines of a penal institution with its attendant rights or advantages.”63 
Sentencing judges are now asked to think about and act upon the interior 
lives of the offender as lived during the sentence.64 Drawing on the 
division with which I began this article, it involves judges not just in 
decisions about sentencing, but directly in the experience of punishment 
through an act of hope management.  
Hope is one of the conditions that inflects the nature of a sentence. It 
gives flavour, character and existential texture to the experience of 
punishment. To be sure, it is not alone in this. Fear, shame, loneliness 
and a host of other affective states shape the true harshness or leniency of 
punishment. Although sentencing cannot take full account of these 
emotional dimensions of an offender’s experience, neither can it be wholly 
insensitive to them and remain a meaningful measure of punishment. And 
yet to the extent that they tend to imagine that the fitness of a carceral 
sentence can be discerned through duration alone, practices of sentencing 
have been detached from this truth. In this respect, the traditional division 
of labour that Justice LeBel describes — between judges who sentence and 
other actors who are concerned with the conditions and implementation of 
that sentence — is uncommonly naïve in its narrow sense of how one 
measures punishment. The Court’s decision in Zinck and the integration 
of parole considerations into the structure of sentencing disrupts this 
division.  
To be clear, the valence of section 743.6 is all wrong: it is motivated 
by a desire to limit hope and, thereby, to increase harshness by inflicting 
greater emotional suffering from the predictive distance of the sentencing 
hearing, without the ability to gauge how the offender in fact changes 
and reacts to punishment. In this, it turns its back on the potential of  
hope — the motivating, productive and (to indulge in raw pragmatism) 
even behaviour-controlling influences of hope. But this legislative 
change also does something structurally interesting. In a small but 
significant way, it invites sentencing judges into imaginative engagement 
                                                                                                                                   
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 In her treatment of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 
(2010), in which the Court held that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole was cruel and 
unusual punishment when applied to juvenile offenders who did not commit homicide, Alice 
Ristroph concludes that the decision “suggests that to assess the severity of a prison sentence, one 
must give some consideration to the prisoner’s subjective experience”: Ristroph, supra, note 54. 
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with the offender’s experience of punishment. On a full, attentive view 
of the sentencing system, a judge can no longer say what was once 
available as a claim: that the conditions of a sentence are not a court’s 
concern. The seal has been broken. 
I read Zinck’s message of caution and restraint about delaying parole 
ineligibility as, in part, sensitivity to this need for a sentencing judge to be 
alive to the way that a sentence is lived and, specifically, to the harshness 
involved in the extinguishment of hope. This is what is “special” about 
delayed parole as a part of punishment; and, this is what calls for prudence 
in its use. If this is correct, then along with the juridical recognition of the 
salience of pain in punishment, Zinck stands as another marker suggestive of 
a turn towards a more expansive way of thinking about criminal punishment, 
a way of thinking more firmly rooted in the offender’s real experience of 
the state’s response to his or her wrongdoing. I turn now to what the 
salience of pain and hope — and the perspective that this implies — might 
mean for the concept of proportionality in sentencing.  
IV. SUFFERING, PROPORTIONALITY AND PUNISHMENT 
Proportionality has become the modern measure of justice.65 The 
movement to broad proportionality standards in constitutional law is a 
feature not just of Canadian jurisprudence, but of constitutional systems 
around the world. Proportionality has appeared as the underlying logic of 
rules of evidence and has even found its way into the law governing civil 
procedure.66 And, of course, proportionality reasoning has a long and 
impressive provenance in the field of sentencing and has assumed 
constitutional status in Canada.67 The prevailing juridical wisdom is that 
the path to just judgment is paved with proportionality reasoning. It has 
offered itself as a kind of conceptual multi-tool, fit for tightening all of 
the furniture of justice. 
                                                                                                                                   
65 I discuss and critique this rise of proportionality in Benjamin L. Berger, “The Abiding 
Presence of Conscience: Criminal Justice Against the Law and the Modern Constitutional 
Imagination” (2011) 61 U.T.L.J. 579. On the centrality of proportionality to modern notions of 
justice, see, e.g., Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); David M. Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Grant Huscroft, Bradley W. Miller & Gregoire Webber, 
eds., Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014). 
66 Hryniak v. Maudlin, [2014] S.C.J. No. 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87, at para. 28 (S.C.C.). 
67 Ipeelee, supra, note 7, at para. 36. 
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And yet there is an abiding indeterminacy at the heart of 
proportionality tests, an uncertainty that renders them oddly (or perhaps 
seductively) agnostic. The normative valence of a proportionality test is 
entirely indeterminate until and unless one knows what is being made 
proportionate to what — until, that is, one knows the points for the 
comparison that proportionality analysis invites. In some areas of law, 
courts have taken care to specify the content of these tests. With respect 
to our section 1 Oakes test,68 for example, work is continually being done 
to fine tune the relevant comparators and the measures of proportionality. 
Yet even in that setting, it is often the case that everything turns on what 
a judge places on the scales of overall balancing. In some settings this 
indeterminacy commends itself as flexibility; in others — in sentencing — 
this agnosticism can be dangerous when held up against the ethical 
stakes of the endeavour.  
To some, the claim that a troubling indeterminacy afflicts the 
principle of proportionality that governs sentencing in Canada will seem 
mislaid. After all, we have a legislated list of the objectives and purposes 
of sentencing, as well as a series of principles, augmenting and filling out 
our fundamental principle of proportionality in sentencing. Although this 
is true, there remains a troubling imprecision in that principle of 
proportionality: although one point of comparison is expanded upon and 
made precise — proportionality has regard, on one side, to “the gravity 
of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender” — the 
other side is ambiguous. What must be made proportionate to the gravity 
of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender? “A 
sentence.” But what is the gravamen of the sentence? The customary 
approach, one that reflects an old-fashioned retributive approach to 
sentencing, has focused judges’ attention on the quantum and form of 
punishment. On this view, proportionality is an essentially quantitative 
assessment. And yet, this way of understanding proportionality effectively 
reads the experience of punishment out of the act of sentencing.  
I have been urging a broader, more political conception of 
punishment and, with it, sentencing. Punishment inheres in the experience 
of the suffering inflicted on an offender by the state in response to his or 
her wrongdoing. That suffering arises from the conditions and actual 
treatment of the offender, the consequences of conviction, and even the 
affective dimensions of the sentence. In contemporary theoretical debates 
                                                                                                                                   
68 See R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). 
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about punishment, a critique of so-called subjectivist theories is that 
focusing on the subjective experience of punishment would involve us in 
the unattractive exercise of calibrating punishment to expensive tastes and 
insensitive offenders.69 Would we have to account for the offender who 
would suffer more in prison because he is used to silk sheets or because of 
the shame of a conviction given his social circles? Might we have to 
punish more severely the offender who is inured to deprivations, having 
lived a particularly harsh life? Such outcomes should trouble us and 
surely call for judgments about when and why we are willing to 
accommodate the subjective experiences of offenders. Yet anxiety about 
the difficulty of those cases should not distract from recognition that the 
experience of suffering is the phenomenological essence of punishment. 
And if this is so, some regard to the sources and character of that suffering 
is essential to a just sentencing process. Thus, although I have 
considerable sympathy for aspects of the subjectivist view of punishment 
given its focus on the experience of punishment as suffering, this article  
is not intended as an embrace of a fully subjectivist approach to 
sentencing nor an answer to the criticisms levied against it. Rather, I 
argue for an expansion of regard in what should be factored into an 
assessment of a fit response to criminal acts. In particular, without having 
to answer the question of accounting for suffering engendered by 
expensive tastes, particular sensitivities, or burdens experienced from 
non-state sources, we can nevertheless give greater and more realistic 
regard to suffering inflicted by the state as such through the criminal 
process. My claim is about a reformation and enlargement of how we 
think about the nature of the punishment that must fit the crime. It is state-
imposed suffering — not just the sentence, narrowly conceived as 
quantum and form — that must be proportional to the gravity of the 
offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender in order to arrive 
at a just and appropriate sentence.  
Yet this article is not chiefly an argument that this is how  
sentencing ought to be calibrated, staking out a position in the theory of  
criminal punishment. The core claim is descriptive, showing that recent 
decisions of the Supreme Court have directed us to the conclusion that 
this is in fact how sentencing should be approached. Nasogaluak, Pham,  
 
 
                                                                                                                                   
69 See, e.g., David Gray, “Punishment as Suffering” (2010) 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1619.  
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and Zinck each insist in their own ways that the measure of “a sentence” 
is to be induced from the details of the experience of the offender. 
Nasogaluak tells us that the pain suffered by the offender is part of the 
sentence; Pham reminds us that the sentence includes the consequences of 
conviction; and Zinck draws us down and inward, into the affective life of 
the offender, showing that hope — and its absence —colours and shapes 
sentence. All of this suggests a turn in thinking about sentencing in Canada, 
one that is more attuned to the lived experience of criminal punishment. 
The jurisprudential marker for this shift is the marriage of 
proportionality and individualization over which Justice LeBel has 
presided in these and other cases. Proportionality, he insists and Pham 
confirms, is an individualized concept, and individualization demands 
attentiveness to the ways in which a sentence will visit itself on and be 
received within the life of an offender. In Justice LeBel’s most celebrated 
contribution to Canadian sentencing law, R. v. Ipeelee,70 his affirmation 
and clarification of the Gladue71 principles governing the sentencing of 
Aboriginal offenders includes a strong message about the centrality and 
nature of this requirement for individualization in sentencing more 
generally. Reviewing the principles of sentencing in Canada, Justice 
LeBel describes proportionality as “the sine qua non of a just sanction”72 
and characterizes it as a principle of fundamental justice,73 but emphasizes 
that the measurement of a just sanction is “a highly individualized process”.74 
In the context of the sentencing of Aboriginal peoples, that individualization 
involves regard to the unique circumstances of the offender, which include 
both the circumstances and background that brought the offender before 
the court and the types of sanctions that may be appropriate. A 
sentencing judge must consider the range of appropriate sanctions not 
because this bears on the culpability of the offender, but because the 
fitness of a sentence can only be assessed in terms of how it will be 
received and experienced by the individual, including the “world views” and 
“values” of offenders.75 Moreover, Justice LeBel insists on reading the 
                                                                                                                                   
70 Ipeelee, supra, note 7.  
71 See R. v. Gladue, [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.). 
72 Ipeelee, supra, note 7, at para. 37. 
73 Id., at para. 36. 
74 Id., at para. 38. 
75 Justice LeBel explains that, when sentencing Aboriginal offenders, sentencing judges 
must “abandon the presumption that all offenders and communities share the same values when it 
comes to sentencing and to recognise that, given these fundamentally different world views, 
different or alternative sanctions may more effectively achieve the objectives of sentencing in a 
particular community” (id., at para. 74). 
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fitness of the punishment in the context of the “legacy of colonialism”76 
and the many historical traumas and structural deprivations suffered by 
Indigenous peoples at the hands of the state. Meeting the critique that 
this amounts to a form of “race-based discount on sentencing”,77 Justice 
LeBel responds that paying attention to the “circumstances” of 
Aboriginal offenders in this rather thick way is not a departure from the 
normal principles of sentencing but, rather, an expression of “the 
fundamental duty of a sentencing judge”,78 which he says is to “engage 
in an individualized assessment of all of the relevant factors and 
circumstances, including the status and life experiences, of the person 
standing before them.”79 What Justice LeBel is describing is an 
imaginative engagement with what the state’s response to wrongdoing 
will mean in and for the particular life of this offender, a sense of what is 
relevant to assessing the fitness of a punishment that is expanded well 
beyond traditional visions of retributivism. In a riposte to the idea that 
the Gladue approach should be abandoned in cases of very serious 
offences, Justice LeBel uses this controlling concept of individualization 
to put the concern for parity in its place:  
[W]ho are courts sentencing if not the offender standing in front of 
them? If the offender is Aboriginal, then courts must consider all of the 
circumstances of that offender, including the unique circumstances 
described in Gladue. There is no sense comparing the sentence that a 
particular Aboriginal offender would receive to the sentence that some 
hypothetical non-Aboriginal offender would receive, because there is 
only one offender standing before the court.80 
The import and appeal of this principle that proportionality is an 
intrinsically individualized concept lies in the way that it denies escape 
to the comfort of cool metrics and abstract guidelines for the judge faced 
with the harrowing moment of intervening in the shape of an individual’s 
life through the infliction of suffering. Ethically, that is as it should be, 
because this demand for sympathetic engagement with the particular 
person standing before the court invites modesty and caution about the 
use and effects of state violence as a response to social breakdown. As a 
legal matter, I suggest that in the wake of these decisions it would now 
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be an error for a judge to speak of proportionality without emphasizing 
the individualized nature of the sentencing process and then wrestling 
with the real effects of the criminal process and proposed sentence on the 
life lived by the offender. 
V. CONCLUSION: THE ROLE OF THE SENTENCING JUDGE 
In his ethnography of the Conseil d’État, French philosopher and 
anthropologist Bruno Latour describes the effort to understand life 
through the language and procedures of law as “like trying to fax a 
pizza”.81 Seeking to understand and account for the lives of offenders, 
and the experience and impacts of state punishment, is a fine example of 
this structural frustration. Despite the flexibility of the rules of evidence 
in the sentencing phase, and even with judges being equipped with 
additional tools (like Gladue reports) to better understand the 
circumstances of the person before them, there is an untraversable gap 
between the act of sentencing and the experience of suffering through 
punishment. The setting of the courtroom, the formal disciplines of 
judicial decision-making, the one-off nature of the judgment, and the 
institutional constraints of the legal system all limit the capacity of the 
act of sentencing to reach into and engage with the lives of offenders. 
The lives and experiences of offenders will always remain foreign to the 
law that is tasked with punishing them. One who is most interested in the 
lives that will be lived by those who are sentenced might be tempted, 
then, to apply Latour’s verdict to the rules and process of sentencing: 
“there would be no point in trying to increase the power of the model, it 
is simply not the right medium”.82 
The turn in Canadian sentencing jurisprudence described in this 
article, a turn in which Justice LeBel has been centrally involved, will 
not eliminate the gap between the law of sentencing and the lives of 
those punished. And yet these cases nudge the law in an important 
direction, calling upon judges to think of punishment and proportionality 
in view of the aggregate suffering experienced by the offender at the 
hands of the state, in response to his or her wrongdoing. The wisdom of 
this expansion of the field of vision for sentencing judges is that it 
respects the truth that the severity of a sanction — and with this, the 
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suffering experienced by the offender — is a function of the character, 
not just the quantum, of punishment. Holding that principle, we might 
begin to imagine new possibilities in our practices of sentencing. 
Informed by Pham’s insistence that the collateral consequences of a 
sentence are part of evaluating a just and appropriate sentence, might we 
imagine a sentencing judge requiring the Crown to provide a plan for 
punishment in which the expected level of security, institutional setting 
and available programming (to name just a few factors) are set out in 
order to allow her to exercise her task of crafting a fit and just sentence? 
With Nasogaluak, Pham and Zinck in mind, might we imagine 
information about the real conditions and experiences within an 
institution — the predictability of violence, the practices of segregation, 
and the experiences of inmates, all points on which we need better 
research and more knowledge83 — becoming essential to the process of 
sentencing? Perhaps administrative and practical difficulties would 
frustrate either development — perhaps it is “simply not the right 
medium” — but a judge who sees that the seal between conditions and 
consequences of punishment, on the one hand, and sentencing, on the 
other has been broken, would stand on solid ground insisting on such 
information as the sine qua non to crafting a fit sentence.  
The most immediate and arguably most significant effect of these 
cases, however, is the way in which they reimagine the role and remit of 
a sentencing judge. If something more of the experience of punishment is 
to ground the assessment of a fit and appropriate sentence, the essential 
task of the judge is an imaginative engagement with the lives of those 
that they punish. This is a fitting reflection of the ethical temper of 
Justice LeBel’s jurisprudence. I suspect that the shift or turn that I have 
described is also a more authentic reflection of the harrowing task 
undertaken daily by sentencing judges. There is no doubt considerable 
comfort to be found in fidelity to an “acoustic separation”84 between the 
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conditions/experience of punishment and the quantum of sentence — a 
comfort understandably sought by judges and commentators alike. But 
the price of that comfort seems unacceptably high in ethical terms, for 
there is something ethically suspect to inflict a sentence without regard to 
the experience of punishment. By sentencing, one is intervening in a life. 
In assessing the justice of that intervention, pain matters; hope matters, 
estrangement, fear, promise and opportunity all matter. It matters that 
Mr. Pham would be deported. It matters what Mr. Nasogaluak 
experienced at the hands of the police. And, it matters what the affective 
life of Mr. Zinck would be. And so in addition to shifting and improving 
our sense of what proportionality in sentencing might mean, these cases 
recover a clear-eyed sense of the role of the sentencing judge and the 
moral burdens of sentencing.  
  
 
